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In the currently dominant discourse about Indian society, the caste system appears as an immoral social 
structure. This moral dimension is perhaps most visible in political and popular rhetoric. Award-
winning author Arundhati Roy (2014) calls the caste system “one of the most brutal modes of 
hierarchical social organisation that human society has known.” A report published in the UK, titled 
The Evil of Caste, denounces the system as “the largest systemic violation of human rights in today’s 
world” (Chahal 2008, 1). The same type of judgement is present in academic scholarship also. By 
deploying the caste hierarchy, one scholar writes, “Brahmins did not articulate ‘human rights’ but ‘caste 
rights’, which had the side effect that, in the course of time, about one-fifth of the total population, as 
‘outcastes’, had virtually no rights. They were treated worse than cattle, which even in legal theory 
ranked above them” (Klostermaier 2007, 296-7). Or in the words of another scholar: “Untouchables ... 
were dehumanized by the caste Hindu order” (Rao 2010, 1).  
   Importantly, the claim made by these authors is not simply that Indian society, like other 
societies, is home to unethical practices that need to be discarded, say, untouchability or violence 
against particular groups. To appreciate what is being said, it is important to distinguish between two 
dimensions of the dominant discourse about caste – a factual and a moral dimension. The first concerns 
the empirical properties attributed to the system: the Hindus are divided into a variety of castes and 
sub-castes; caste forms a hierarchical social organization; Brahmins traditionally occupy the highest 
position in the caste hierarchy and possess certain privileges; endogamy and commensality play major 
roles in the interaction between different castes, as do practices of untouchability and concerns about 
purity and pollution.  
From these factual claims, descriptions of the caste system easily move to moral judgements. 
They do so by highlighting certain practices as blatant instances of caste discrimination: members of 
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some castes cannot take water from the same wells or drink from the same cup as other castes; often, 
they are not allowed to enter the homes and temples of the latter. Untouchable castes have to live in 
separate quarters in a village and keep a physical distance from upper-caste members. Caste 
membership decides issues like who is an acceptable partner for marriage or which persons can have 
food together. According to these descriptions, anyone who defies the customs of caste is subject to 
violent reprisals: expulsion from one’s caste, general ostracism, degrading treatment, and physical 
violence. 
When authors identify such practices as reprehensible behaviour, they do something more. 
According to them, the practices instantiate the recurring patterns of interaction that characterize caste 
as a social system. They represent the relevant practices as manifestations of the structure that 
attributes a superior position to certain castes and an inferior one to others. Moreover, these authors 
suggest, the fact that deviant behaviour is punished so severely shows that it is understood as a 
violation of something. Of what? Since there is no political or religious authority that imposes explicit 
caste laws, it must concern violation of a different kind of rule: the kind that states moral obligations. 
In other words, according to the dominant discourse about caste, these odious practices must be 
manifestations of the principles that constitute the caste system.  
As Balagangadhara (2012, 104) argues, this discourse implies that “the caste system is an 
immoral social order twice over: not only does the practice of caste discrimination violate certain moral 
norms, but also, as a social order, it makes immorality obligatory.” Caste is a brutal mode of hierarchical 
social organisation because its rules compel people to act in inhumane ways. This is the moral dimension 
of the dominant discourse about the caste system: it is viewed as a social organization that transforms 
immorality into a duty by representing its rules as moral obligations, even though they are immoral.  
This characterization of the caste system is inherently implausible, Balagangadhara points out. 
On the one hand, it transforms the large majority of Indians – all those who have not explicitly and 
unfailingly renounced the caste system – into immoral beings bound to discriminate and dehumanize. 
On the other hand, it implies that the same people show a moral integrity of a perverse kind. They are 
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immoral “not because they violate moral obligations but because the obligations which they obey are 
immoral in nature” (2012, 108). That is, it is their desire and capacity to be moral by consistently living 
up to one’s duties that transforms them into immoral beings. Thus, these descriptions carry two 
contradictory messages: the meta-level message suggests that Indians are rational and moral by 
consistently following a set of rules or principles; the object-level message says just the opposite, since 
the same people systematically engage in immoral and irrational behaviour (Balagangadhara 2012, 109). 
According to the textbook story, generation after generation of Hindus lived by unethical rules 
and raised their children to do the same. Even worse, they did so in the face of a variety of movements 
that revealed the injustice of this system and aimed to abolish it, from Buddhism and the Bhakti 
traditions to the British missionaries. The same story suggests that it is only because this message 
eventually penetrated the minds of educated Indians that the post-Independence state implemented 
legislation that abolishes untouchability, penalizes caste discrimination, and aims to set right the 
historic injustices of caste. Even then, commentators lament, these laws have had little impact on the 
attitudes of the average Indian: caste violence and discrimination thrive in contemporary India (see 
Jalki and Pathan, this volume). Consequently, the Indian people must show a stubborn insistence to 
live by this system of obligations and prohibitions, even after receiving recurrent proof of its immorality.  
If this textbook story is correct, the caste system has an extraordinary capacity to deceive people. 
As a social structure, it is able to blind the men and women living under its spell to such an extent that 
they cannot see what everyone else appears to see so easily. To those who are not part of the caste 
system, it appears to be self-evidently immoral. In contrast, those who live in its confines remain blind 
to its immorality and continue to follow its rules.  
How did this inherently implausible conception of the caste system come into being? How 
could it be reproduced for centuries as though it constitutes a veridical description of Indian society? 
Thanks to Balagangadhara’s work (1994, 2012), we are aware today that the dominant representations 
of Indian culture emerged within the framework of Western culture: they tell us more about the 
Western cultural experience and its limits than they do about India. Thus, we know where to seek 
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answers. This chapter aims to take some steps forward by focussing on the emergence of the factual 
and moral structures that are attributed to the caste system today. It will examine the different 
elements that coalesced into the dominant picture of caste as an immoral social structure.  
The first section looks at the crystallization of the idea that the Indian subcontinent was 
populated by a nation divided into a hierarchy of four tribes and united by a common religion. 
Surprisingly, this description appears to have mapped the Indian people and culture onto the structure 
of the Jewish nation described in the Old Testament. The second section examines the moral dimension 
of the discourse about caste. The belief that India was home to an idolatrous nation inevitably led to 
negative judgements about some of the practices and customs found there. Both Catholic and 
Protestant authors condemned the Brahmins as a self-interested and deceitful priesthood. However, 
for many decades, such descriptions went together with ambiguous statements about the morality of 
Hindu society and its division into castes.  
The third section raises a central question: if earlier authors wrote about the moral status of 
caste in different ways, which change in conditions accounts for the crystallization and consolidation 
of the conception of caste as an immoral social system? The causes behind this shift, I suggest, lie 
neither in increasing knowledge about Indian society nor in some general process of moral progress, 
but in a very different factor: the impact of the Reformation on Western culture and its understanding 
of other cultures. As a result of an internal shift in the Protestant views of India, the conception of 
caste acquired a more systematic and coherent structure than it had known before. It became “the 
system of caste,” an institution that merged religion and civil law and presented the rules of caste as 
religious obligations. In the concluding section, I raise some questions for future research that emerge 
from the discovery that today’s moral discourse about the caste system is almost identical in structure 
to that developed by Christian missionaries in the nineteenth century.  
1. The Facts of a Heathen Nation 
Most observers today would agree that caste in India constitutes a hierarchical system with an internal 
coherence and logic, which traditionally organizes the social life of the Hindus. This is the minimal 
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factual structure attributed to the caste system, without which there would be no system to speak of. 
Importantly, up until the sixteenth century, European observers did not notice such a clear structure 
when they looked at Indian society (Rubiés 2002, 11). In the course of the seventeenth century, 
however, a particular way of ordering the European observations of Indian society emerged in travel 
accounts and missionary reports: the notion began to crystallize that one ‘Gentile’ or ‘heathen’ nation 
populated India, which was divided into four general tribes or lineages, subdivided into many clans, 
and held together by an institution that ranked these tribes according to nobility and purity.  
 Did this description emerge as the result of more accurate observations and the accumulation 
of empirical data about Indian society? This is implausible. For one, it ignores the conceptual problems 
that we still face in understanding the Hindus as a nation united by a common religion and caste 
hierarchy. From the nineteenth century onwards, the study of Indian society would produce more and 
more anomalies that undermined this account. During the colonial census, attempts to categorize the 
various groups of ‘Hindus’ according to a caste hierarchy revealed that it was impossible to do so in 
any coherent way (Blunt 1931, 8-9; Dirks 2002, 49, 202-212; Strachey 1911, 328-30). Consequently, 
the account could hardly be the result of the accumulation of information. Moreover, we know today 
that such ordered descriptions always depend on the concepts available to the describer. That is, when 
early modern European observers described the people of India as a nation consisting of a number of 
tribes or lineages organized into a hierarchy, they drew upon a particular set of conceptual resources, 
including notions like nation, tribe, and heathen religion.  
Consider the observations made by two very different European travellers to India: the Italian 
adventurer and Catholic nobleman Pietro Della Valle, who travelled through the south of India in the 
1620s, and the Dutch East India Company translator and Calvinist cleric Abraham Rogerius who stayed 
on the Coromandel coast in the first half of the seventeenth century. Della Valle wrote as follows:  
 
The whole Gentile-people of India is divided into many sects or parties of men, known and 
distinguisht by descent or pedigree, as the Tribes of the Jews sometimes were; yet they inhabit 
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the Country promiscuously mingled together, in every City and Land several Races one with 
another. ’Tis reckon’d that they are in all eighty four; some say more, making a more exact and 
subtle division. Every one of these hath a particular name, and also a special office and 
Employment in the Commonwealth, from which none of the descendants of that Race ever 
swerve ... . (Grey 1892, 77-8)  
 
All these “tribes” or “races,” Della Valle suggested, were derived by minute subdivision from the four 
principal ones, namely “the Brachmans, the Souldiers, the Merchants and the Artificers.” The Brahmins 
are held the noblest and purest, “because their employment is nothing else but the Divine Worship, 
the service of Temples and Learning, and because they observe their own Religion with more rigor then 
any others.” Again, he compared this to Judaism: he pointed out that the Brahmins among the Indians 
much resemble the Levites of the Jews. They too are divided into several sorts, with gradations of 
nobility, which also make them more rigorous in manner of eating and in superstitious ceremonies. 
They are astrologers, scholars, physicians, and secretaries, “but the most esteem’d and most sublime 
amongst the Brachmans, and consequently the most rigorous of all in point of eating and other 
observances, are those who perform the Office of Priests, whom they call Boti” (Grey 1892, 80).  
In a work titled The Open Door to Hidden Heathendom (1651), Rogerius wrote in very similar terms 
about the people he encountered on the Coromandel coast. He presented them as “a heathen nation” 
consisting of four general tribes (stammen) or lineages (geslachten), each of which was valued higher 
than the next. The first and most distinguished was the “Tribus” of the Brahmins (Rogerius 1651, 2-3). 
Their office was to teach others and particularly to inculcate heathenism (ibid., 29-30). The law book 
of these heathens was the Veda, a text which contained everything they had to believe and all the 
ceremonies they had to perform. It ascribed a special status to the Brahmin tribe and provided them 
with certain privileges and prerogatives by divine injunction (ibid., 3, 26). The Jews also played a central 
role in Rogerius’ account: in the notes to his work, he pointed out the many resemblances between 
Jewish institutions and practices and those of the Brahmins (occasionally, he also compared the 
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customs of the Indian heathens to those of other peoples like the Arabs, Chaldeans, or Egyptians). In 
several cases, he even drew upon biblical references to suggest that the Brahmins had adopted practices 
and stories from the Jews (ibid., 10-11, 33, 60).    
What is striking about these two accounts is the parallel they draw with the Old Testament 
Jews. At first sight, this may appear as a typical instance of describing the unknown in terms of the 
known. While true, such a claim misses what is happening in these texts: the very structure attributed 
to the “Gentile” people of India by these authors transformed it into a variant of the ancient nation of 
Israel. That is, the descriptive terms invoked by Della Valle and Rogerius indicate that they had already 
ordered their perception of the Indian people and traditions by mapping these onto the Jewish nation 
and religion described in the Bible.  
The image of “a heathen nation” made up of “tribes” or “lineages” derived from the conception 
of the Jews as a nation consisting of tribes that were traced to different forefathers and united by a 
common religion and worship of God. When Della Valle said that “the employment” of the Brahmins 
is nothing but “the divine worship and the service of temples and learning” and that they hold “the 
office of priests,” he had already transformed them into an equivalent of the tribe of the Levites, whose 
role in Jewish religion was described along similar lines (Grey 1892, 77-80). It is after having 
conceptualized “the heathen nation of India” as a variant of the ancient nation of Israel that these 
seventeenth-century authors then postulate explicit similarities between the Indian heathens and the 
Jews. The Brahmins among the Gentiles, Della Valle said, resemble the Levites among the Jews. In fact, 
Rogerius (1651, 10-11, 33, 60) added, it was not simply the case that Jews and Brahmins had many 
things in common, but also that the latter had borrowed practices and stories from the former. 
Tribes and Priests 
According to the Old Testament, the tribes of the Jews had become one nation through a covenant with 
God. The offer and substance of this covenant was revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai and engraved in 
the tables of the Decalogue, which were then deposited in the ark of the covenant. While the laws given 
with the covenant expressed God’s requirements of Israel, His offer of covenant also came with a divine 
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promise: “You shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Exodus 19:6). The priesthood 
had the responsibility of maintaining the unique covenantal relationship with God and possessed the 
prerogative to expound the Mosaic law, minister to the ark, and sacrifice at the central sanctuary 
(McCready 1979-1988, 965; Rehm 1992, 305).  
Members of one of the tribes, that of Levi, were set apart and divinely appointed as priests to 
perform the religious ceremonies (or as lower priests that served at the temple, according to some 
accounts). These Levites held the office of priesthood not because of a vocation, as was the case in 
Catholic Christianity, but because it was an exclusive hereditary office passed on from generation to 
generation. With this office came special privileges that distinguished them from ordinary Israelites: 
“A drastic and clearcut distinction was made between the sphere of the cult and the rest of the 
community. ... The ‘realm of contact with God’ (the sacrificial places) had limited access and demanded 
skilled entrance. Only one group of people was permitted, by the grace and appointment of God, to 
come into contact with the holy areas—the priests” (McCready 1979-1988, 967).  
The Levite priests also played a central role in the assessment and treatment of impurity. 
Disease was considered the tangible embodiment of an impure spirit, which had to be cured through 
specific acts of purification. “The priests dealt with impurities and diseases as a regular part of their 
profession, for the continued presence of impurity would eventually undermine their sacrificial system 
and the status of their holiness as representatives of the people.” Old Testament passages show that 
this “kind of activity eventually grew into a highly sophisticated system of judging and anticipating 
impurities of animals and carcasses, bodily disorders, etc., as well as impurity of corpses” (ibid., 968). 
 The basic concepts of this account of the Jewish nation structured the experience of early 
modern European observers of Indian society. They understood the division of the Hindu people into 
“castes” along the lines of the tribes of Israel and their subdivisions into clans. The Brahmins were the 
equivalent of the Levites or “the tribe of the priesthood.” Once this basic structure was in place, later 
authors began to draw on the same set of conceptual resources to make sense of the traditions and 
practices they encountered in India. On the one hand, these descriptions of caste explicitly compare 
9 
	
the practices and religion of the Hindus (or Indian heathens) to those of the Jews. On the other hand, 
they implicitly model the people and culture of India onto the Jewish nation and religion by using the 
relevant concepts from the Old Testament as though these offer adequate terms to understand a people 
living more than 1,500 years later in a region far away from the Middle East. 
In a work translated into English by the Deist John Toland and published in 1705, a French 
author of uncertain identity, named De la Crequinière, argued that the practices of the Indian pagans 
corresponded with those of the Jews: “The Pagan-Indians are divided into Tribes, as formerly the Jews 
were” and besides the general division, “each Tribe is divided into an infinite number of others, which 
are quite different from one another, either in their Food, or in something else.” What the Jews called 
tribes, he added, the Indians “call Castes, i.e. Clans.” Both knew of a hierarchy but this was much stricter 
among the pagan-Indian nation, where a strict antipathy ruled towards the most contemptible castes 
such as that of “the Parias” (La Crequinière 1705, 70). These views on the conformity between the 
customs of the Jews and those of the Indians would soon spread widely across the educated classes of 
Europe. De la Crequinière’s text was included as a section on Indian religion in the bestseller 
compilation Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde (1723-43), which was translated, 
pirated, and imitated across Western Europe (Hunt, Jacob and Mijnhardt 2010).  
Again, this parallel between the religion of India and that of the Jews should not be mistaken 
for a simple mapping of the unfamiliar onto the familiar, by opening up “the possibility of comparing 
the religion of the gentiles of India to more familiar religions, using the Jews as a point of passage” 
(Subrahmanyam 2010, 201). This kind of explanation ignores and trivializes something much more 
fundamental: the early modern Christian understanding of the ancient nation of Israel described in the 
Old Testament became the framework for making sense of the people of India and provided terms of 
description that would remain central to future European accounts of India, its religion, and its social 
structure.  
Without invoking any explicit analogy, authors deployed conceptual schemes that transformed 
the religion of the Hindus into a variant of that of the Jews. This becomes clear in the writings of the 
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eighteenth-century East India Company servants. In a work published in 1763, for instance, Robert 
Orme (1763, 3-4) referred to the plethora of “casts or tribes” among the Indians and suggested that 
the Brahmins are “the tribe of the priesthood,” whose doctrines are followed implicitly by the whole 
nation. His colleague Luke Scrafton (1761, 6-7) argued that the custom distinguishing the Indians from 
the rest of humankind is the division of the natives into tribes. He noted that “the four principal tribes,” 
namely “the Bramins, Soldiers, Labourers, and Mechanics” are subdivided “into a multiplicity of 
inferior distinctions” and claimed that, among each of these tribes, Brahmins have the care of religion 
allotted to them (Scrafton 1761, 8-9). In what he claimed was an excerpt from “the scriptures of the 
Gentoos,” John Zephaniah Holwell (1765, 345) wrote about “the holy Tribe of Bramins, who were 
chosen and appointed by Bramah himself, to preach the word of God, and labor the salvation of the 
delinquents.” Again and again, the claim was that the Brahmin priesthood possessed the same type of 
privileges and prerogatives in religion as the Jewish priesthood had known. “The tribe of Brahmins,” 
Thomas Maurice (1800, 25) noted, “is alone allowed to read the Vedas; and they explain them as they 
please to the other three tribes, who receive implicitly the interpretation of their priests.” 
At times, the reports about “the religion of the Hindus” continued to draw explicit comparisons 
and present these as salient facts, after already having conceptualized this “religion” as a variant of 
Judaism. In the introduction to his Code of Gentoo Laws (1776) – the first English translation of a 
dharmashastra compilation and an important text of this period – Nathaniel Halhed pointed out the 
similitude between “the Mosaical and the Hindoo dispensation” and had the following to say about the 
Brahmins:  
 
Indeed the whole Office, as well as the sacred Preeminence of the Braminical Tribe, is almost 
an exact Counterpart of that of the Levitical: The Levites were particularly forbidden Wine; so 
are the Bramins. The Levites were more than others enjoined to avoid the Contact of all 
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Uncleanness; so are the Bramins. The Levites were to assist the Magistrate’s Judgment in 
difficult Cases; so are the Bramins. (Halhed 1776, lxxiii) 
 
Similarly, writing in late eighteenth-century Bengal, the Baptist missionary William Carey made the 
following claims in a passage about “the character of the Hindoos”: 
 
One cannot help remarking the similarity there is between many of the practices of the Hindoos 
and the institutions of the Levitical law. Their ideas of contracting uncleanness by touching a 
bone, a grave, a dead person, or any unclean animal, are uniformly very much like the precepts 
of the law respecting these things: for after touching any such thing, they always bathe and 
change their clothes. The cast also bears some resemblance to the Jewish law, which required 
the tribes to be kept separate, and not to intermarry, lest they should mar their inheritance. ... 
The distinction of the Levites from the rest of the people for holy purposes, and the different 
orders of the Levites, have an affinity to the proper employment of the Brammhans, and to the 
different classes of that tribe, much more striking than you would imagine. The Brammhans 
are a tribe entirely separate to the maintenance of learning, and the performance of religious 
rites: but they are of many different orders, who are all of them attached to the different tribes 
of Hindoos, and are ranked accordingly in the society of the Brammhans. (Cited in Staughton 
1811, 180-81) 
 
The Brahmins’ role in the religion of India was quasi identical to that of the Jewish priesthood then. 
They had the duty to perform its ceremonies of divine worship and the prerogative to expound the laws 
of religion. They received privileges such as the special access to the sacred that set them apart from 
ordinary believers. The Brahmins also shared the concern for purity with the Levites and, like them, 
had developed a sophisticated system of judging, anticipating, and remedying impurities. Consequently, 
their many “ablutions” constituted another striking fact related to the Hindu religion, since these 
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practices corresponded to the purification ceremonies of the Levite priests. In the Bible, these practices 
were founded in the Jewish law revealed by God to Moses; in India, these authors pointed out, “the 
cast” appeared to play a similar role.   
Lawgivers and Outcasts 
The figure of Moses was another crucial component of the biblical account of the nation of Israel. He 
was the deliverer of the Jews from captivity and the prophet to whom God revealed the laws of the 
covenant at Mount Sinai. In his work The Hebrew Republic (2010), Eric Nelson shows that the Old 
Testament and the Mosaic law played a major role in the political thinking of the seventeenth-century 
Protestant world. In the wake of the Reformation, European thinkers increasingly came to see the 
Hebrew Bible “as a set of political laws that God himself had given to the Israelites as their civil 
sovereign. Moses was now to be understood as a lawgiver, as the founder of a politeia in the Greek sense.” 
During this era, the text began to function as the source for understanding the perfect political 
constitution designed by God (Nelson 2010, 16). The covenant law came to be seen as the foundation 
or constitution of a new nation headed by God (Elwell and Beitzel 1988, 533-4).  
From the late seventeenth century, this conception of Moses as a lawgiver fed into a general 
theory which claimed that every civilized nation had its origin in a first legislator who provided it with 
a legal foundation. In the act of constituting such nations, ancient lawgivers drew upon the sense of 
divinity implanted in every man to pretend that they had received a divine revelation as to the laws that 
a people should follow in order to obey God (or the gods). Thus, these lawgivers were false variants of 
Moses: ingenious impostors who had used religion to secure strict obedience to a set of laws that were 
in fact the civil laws of a nation. The success in establishing a nation depended on this merging of civil 
law with divine injunction (Blount n.d., 3; Bolingbroke 1777, 58; Herbert of Cherbury 1768, 39-40, 92-
3; Wilkins 1678, 44).   
It is not yet clear to me why such importance was given to the fact that the lawgivers had 
presented the civil laws of a nation as religious obligations. However, the eighteenth-century European 
descriptions of India do show how significant this cluster of ideas had become in the attempt to 
13 
	
understand alien cultures. Scrafton speculated that the hierarchical division of people was the invention 
of an ancient legislator (“Brumma”) who left “the Gentoos of India” with a sacred book (the “Vidam”) 
that instituted their religion and introduced rules of pollution and purity. The Hindus consider their 
customs as part of their religion, he asserted, because these are sanctioned by the divine character of 
their legislator (Scrafton 1761, 8-9). A French nobleman who travelled to India in the same period 
noted that the civil laws of the Hindus were all maxims of religion, which accounted for the fact that 
civil law had a stronger hold here than among any other people on earth. The first legislators of the 
Hindu nation, the ancestors of the Brahmins, had thus firmly instituted the caste order by making it 
indivisible from religion (Deloche 1971, 372-3). Or as an entry in the Asiatic Annual Register for 1799 
put it:  
 
The laws of the Hindûs are intimately blended with their religion. They believe them to have 
been promulged by Menu, the son of Brahma, and to have received the sanction of God. The 
strict observance of them is therefore enjoined as a religious duty, and the smallest breach of 
them is deemed a glaring impiety. No human power is authorised to alter, much less to annul 
them. (Anonymous 1800, 5-6.)  
 
Many authors agreed: behind the religion and civilization of the Hindus must have stood an ancient 
lawgiver who had presented the laws of this nation as divine revelation (Bernier 1671, 125; Holwell 
1765, 7, 22; Jones 1796, iii-iv; Lord 1630, 40-41; Martin 1769, 462). This first legislator – initially 
identified as Brahma and later as Manu – was supposed to have performed a role very similar to that 
played by Moses as the covenant mediator and lawgiver of the Hebrew nation. By invoking a divine 
revelation, he had made the customs of the Hindus part of religion and given them a foundation in 
sacred law; thus, he had founded the Hindu nation.  
Once this isomorphism was in place, other aspects of Judaism could help the Europeans to 
structure their understanding of the foreign culture of India. Again, De la Crequinière (1705, 76) stated 
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explicitly what remained implicit in other descriptions: “The Indians have among them such Persons as 
are Excommunicate, as formerly the Jews had. He that is Excommunicate is said to lose his Caste, i.e. he is 
no more to be reckon’d as one of the Members of his Tribe.” This was a reference to the punishment of 
herem or “excommunication” in Judaism, which entailed “the expulsion of a Jew from all aspects of 
Jewish community life” (Karesh and Hurvitz 2006, 205). By violating the Mosaic law, one could put 
oneself outside the covenant relationship and, for this reason, be excommunicated (Silva and Tenney 
2009, 458). This involved a practical prohibition of all intercourse with society. The meaning of the 
Hebrew terms used to refer to this practice indicate its impact: “to be excluded or cut off,” “banish,” 
“desolation” or “thing of horror” (Ridge 2003, 521). The Talmud not only specified twenty-four 
offences that could lead to herem but also stipulated the distance that members of the Jewish community 
should keep away from the excommunicates.  
Now, as we notice in De la Crequinière’s words, the Christian understanding of the Jewish 
practice of herem played a central role in the crystallization of another idea that would prove central to 
the European image of Indian society: the idea that there was a separate class of people among the 
Hindus, which existed outside of the caste hierarchy and its laws. Already in the mid seventeenth 
century, Rogerius (1651, 10-11) discussed “the Perreaes” as a separate lineage considered too unworthy 
by the heathens to belong to their tribes; they existed outside of the four principal tribes of the heathen 
nation and lived in separate parts of towns and villages. This group was considered impure by the 
Brahmins and could therefore not use the same water wells or access the temples – sacred places defiled 
by their presence. Rogerius again related this to the concerns about purity among the Jews and referred 
the reader to biblical verses from Leviticus and Numbers.  
During the eighteenth century, European authors took further steps in mapping the idea of a 
fifth class of “outcasts” onto the institution of excommunication among the Jews. Scrafton, for instance, 
pointed to a group called “the Hallachores, who I cannot call a tribe, being rather the refuse of all the 
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tribes.” These had been excluded from the system established by the ancient legislator because they 
had violated its laws:  
 
All the different tribes are kept distinct from each other, by insurmountable barriers; they are 
forbid to intermarry, to cohabit, to eat with each other, or even to drink out of the same vessel 
with one of another tribe; and every deviation in these points, subjects them to be reject by 
their tribe, renders them for ever polluted, and they are thenceforward obliged to herd with the 
Hallachores. (Scrafton 1761, 8-9)  
 
One of his colleagues in the East India Company similarly noted a fifth group distinct from the four 
main castes, called “the Chandalas,” which consisted of those expelled from all castes. This expulsion 
was “a punishment inflicted for certain offences.” These people, he wrote, were denied any rank in 
society, could not enter a temple and be present at any religious ceremony or serve in any public 
employment. “Hence the punishment of expulsion, which is supposed in its consequences to extend 
even to another life, becomes more terrible than that of death” (Craufurd 1790, 124).  
These were the first of thousands of similar descriptions of “the outcasts,” “the casteless” or 
“the untouchables” that would be produced in the coming centuries. Nineteenth-century authors 
continued to describe exclusion from caste as the equivalent of excommunication among the Jews. As 
before, this parallel took the form of the conviction that there is a separate class of impure people 
placed outside of the caste system and subject to the greatest abhorrence and vile treatment. In a 
famous text that functioned as a handbook for the training of East India Company officials for many 
years, the Abbé Dubois (1817, 29) argued that expulsion from caste is “a kind of civil excommunication, 
which debars the unhappy object of it from all intercourse whatever with his fellow creatures. He is a 
man, as it were, dead to the world.” Those who transgress the rules of the institution of caste in India, 
another missionary wrote, become “the victims of civil and social disabilities, as if already dead” 
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(Roberts 1847, vi). Even the terms of “horror” and “social death” used in such analyses appear to go 
back to the vocabulary used to characterize the practice of herem among the Jews. 
The Factual Structure 
The point of this section is not simply to state that early modern Europe relied on the Bible and its 
conceptual resources to come to systematic descriptions of Indian culture and society. Others have 
shown that European scholars drew upon the chronology and ‘ethnology’ of the Old Testament as a 
framework for making sense of the diversity of peoples encountered in the human past and in other 
parts of the world (Sutcliffe 2003, 58-78; Trautmann 1997). The tentative hypothesis offered here is 
stronger: the basic factual structure that is still attributed to “the caste system” is dependent on understanding the 
people and culture of India as a variant of the nation and religion of the Jews, as it was described in the Old 
Testament and understood by post-Reformation Christendom. Without this background, Europeans 
could not have characterized the many groups and traditions they encountered in India as one nation 
consisting of a hierarchy of tribes or castes, founded by a lawgiver, and dominated by the tribe of the 
priesthood and its privileges and prerogatives.  
 Today’s textbook discourse about the caste system still presents the Hindus as a people divided 
into a hierarchy of castes and the Brahmins as the privileged priestly caste. It continues to say that 
certain groups in Indian society are the descendants of people originally expelled from their caste as a 
punishment for violating the laws of the caste system (see Klostermaier 2007, 296-7). In eighteenth-
century descriptions, we could still see what would become murky in later writings: such descriptions 
order a set of phenomena observed in Indian society by describing them as equivalents of practices and 
institutions in Judaism. The tribe of the priesthood were the privileged expounders of the Mosaic law. 
Excommunication was a punishment for the violation of this law, which excluded one from the 
covenantal relationship with God that constituted the Jewish nation. Mutatis mutandis, the Brahmins 
formed the caste of the priesthood and certain groups in India were “excommunicates” permanently 
17 
	
excluded from the caste hierarchy – the Hindu lawgiver’s system that constituted the nation in the 
name of divine revelation – because they had at one point violated its laws.  
2. The Morals of a Heathen Nation 
So far we have ignored the crystallization of the moral dimension in the European discourse about 
caste. There is a reason for this. When early modern European authors gave factual descriptions of 
‘caste’ and ‘religion’ in Indian society, they often expressed negative judgements about heathen idolatry. 
They also condemned some of the customs and practices they discovered in this part of the world. 
However, it took them much longer to conceptualize the distinct moral structure that would later be 
attributed to the caste system: a social organization that deceives people into following a set of immoral 
principles as moral obligations.  
 Seventeenth-century travellers discerned many practices that future authors would consider as 
loathsome manifestations of the scheme of caste. Della Valle, for instance, noted that several groups 
in Indian society avoid touching each other and eating together. They conceive themselves to be 
polluted by communication with less noble groups and purify themselves “from the defilement by 
washings and other arrogant Ceremonies.” Significantly, he gave a factual account of these practices 
without discussing their moral status: he found it “a pretty sight to behold the great respect which 
upon this account the ignoble bear to the more noble then themselves, and how upon meeting in the 
street the ignoble not onely [sic] give place, but dance wildly up and down for fear of rushing against 
the noble, and polluting them in any measure” (Grey 1892, 80-81). The reference to “arrogant 
Ceremonies” is the only statement of disapproval in this passage. This derived from the description of 
Indian religion as a variant of Judaism: a religion of external ceremonies wrongly believed to be pleasing 
to God.  
That this statement did not involve a general moral disapproval of caste-related practices is 
clear from Della Valle’s account of “a strange Custom,” which he said sprang from the different tribes’ 
averseness to communicate with each other and which he was “delighted not only to see, but also 
sometimes out of gallantry to imitate in conversation.” This custom, which he baptized “drinking in the 
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Air,” is that of drinking from a vessel without touching it with the lips (ibid., 81-2). This educated 
Italian observed the very same practices that would later inspire the strongest moral condemnations of 
the caste system but took a morally neutral stance towards them (ibid., 83-4). Similarly, the Calvinist 
cleric Rogerius gave neutral accounts of the relevant practices of the Brahmins and of the division of 
the heathen nation of India into four tribes and a separate class of impure people. 
The Power of the Priesthood 
Naturally, moral judgements were not absent from the European accounts of Indian society during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. From a Christian perspective, a society corrupted by false religion 
and devil worship could not but harbour many immoral practices. Once the Brahmins had been 
identified as the priests of the local brand of heathen religion, they became the object of many a moral 
diatribe. From the seventeenth century, European authors of all stripes and colours began to accuse 
the Brahmanical priesthood of establishing the hierarchy of castes in its own interest.  
In De La Crequinière’s text, we note how closely related this was to his understanding of the 
Indian religion as a duplicate of that of the Jews. He left no doubt that both nations shared the miserable 
condition of enslavement to a tyranny of priests and laws:   
 
First, Both of them liv’d in hard Bondage, to which they were so much the more subject, 
because they lov’d it, and even ador’d their Captivity; I mean that of the Law, which was the 
hardest Slavery. …[T]hey are only Machines, which are mov’d by their Priests; who inspire them 
either with Boldness or Fear, according as they assure them of gaining or losing a Battel. They 
Fight sometimes in Defence of their Religion with great Obstinacy, which being founded upon 
some Promise of their Diviners, cannot proceed but from a Furious Rage: And these Miserable 
Wretches do not perceive, that they do but strengthen their Fetters, and increase the weight of 
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their Chains, while they give the Priests occasion, by their Victories, to confirm the Law, or 
rather their own Tyranny. (La Crequinière 1705, 136-7) 
 
Robert Orme wrote that the “influence of priestcraft over superstition is no where so visible as in India” 
and noted that the Brahmins derived many temporal advantages from their spiritual authority (Orme 
1753, 432 and 1763, 3-4). Another East India Company servant, Georg Forster, wrote the following 
about the “Shastre,” a text he identified as a commentary on the Vedas:  
 
From the Shastre proceed those preposterous and irreconcileably [sic] superstitious 
ceremonies which have been dragged by their doctors into the Hindoo system of worship; all 
of them tending to shackle the vulgar mind, and produce in it a slavish reverence for the tribe 
of Bramins. The privilege of reading the Baids and expounding its texts is only allowed to them, 
and prohibited under severe penalties from the inspection of the other casts. By the sole 
investment of this singular authority, the priest is left at liberty to explain the original doctrine 
as may be the most conducive in consolidating the power and promoting the interests of his 
order. (Forster 1785, 23-4)  
 
In such observations, we witness the emergence of a dimension that would be central to the future 
conception of the caste system: under the guise of religion, the Brahmin priesthood had represented 
certain ceremonies as religious duties and thus enslaved the Hindu believers to a tyranny of law.  
This account was built around two interrelated clusters of ideas from the intra-Christian 
debates that had taken place in Europe during the preceding centuries. The first is the critique of 
Judaism as a religion of bondage to law and ceremony. This originated in the view that Christianity and 
its new covenant of freedom and grace had superseded the old covenant of law that formed the core of 
Judaism. Certain passages in the New Testament indicated that the coming of Christ had abrogated 
the Mosaic law or at least many of its elements. The Gospel, Christian theologians argued, had made 
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all kinds of restrictions and rules of the nation of Israel’s covenant with God superfluous to religion. 
Such customs and ceremonies were now indifferent to the worship of God, for His revelation in Jesus 
Christ had brought all nations and races together into one people – irrespective of language, custom, 
and external ceremonial. However, this account continued, the stubborn Jews continued to take the 
Law literally and practice empty ceremonies; they could not see that Christianity had supplanted 
Judaism, that “the New Testament” made void “the Old Testament” (Falk 1992, 1-100; Hubbard 1996, 
961). Since the power and privileges of the Jewish priesthood depended on the belief in the old 
covenant, it kept in place the bondage of law.  
Secondly, these accounts of the Brahmin priesthood also derived from the Protestant 
Reformation’s attack against the Roman-Catholic Church. What had started out as a rejection of the 
authority of the papacy and its clerical hierarchy would soon give rise to a more general critique of “the 
religion of the priest.” This went hand in hand with the above ideas about Judaism: one of the popular 
tropes among Protestant authors was to liken the “popery” of the Church to the rules and rites of 
rabbinic Judaism (Sutcliffe 2003, 85-6). In fact, these characterizations transformed both Catholicism 
and Judaism into negations of the ideals of Protestant Christianity: the latter stood for Christian liberty 
and inner spiritual faith; the former embodied clerical tyranny and servitude to external ceremonial and 
laws. This contrast then served as a general template for conceptualizing “false religion” or, in secular 
sounding terms, “organized religion”: it was a tyranny of laws and ceremonies imposed by a priesthood 
that used the name of God to claim religious authority (see Balagangadhara 1994; De Roover 2015, 
169-233; Gelders and Derde 2003; Gelders 2009).        
By the eighteenth century, these two clusters of ideas appear to have become so generic and 
widespread that they could constitute the conceptual background for the common European accounts 
of Indian culture. The description of the Brahmins as a priesthood with absolute dominion over the 
minds of the Hindu nation would soon spread widely across Western Europe. It appeared in popular 
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texts like the gazetteers, geographical dictionaries and encyclopaedias of this age and gradually 
ensconced itself in the educated public’s image of India.1  
Moral Ambiguity 
Nevertheless, the account of caste as an immoral social system had not yet crystallized into a stable picture 
in this era. For Scrafton (1761, 8-9), the injustice of the excommunication of certain people from social 
life was an introduction into the system of the Hindu lawgiver rather than a core characteristic. A reviewer 
of a book that accused the Brahmanical system and its division of castes of being “more injurious to 
morality than any other ever invented by the craft of designing men” argued that this thesis was 
completely falsified by the centuries-long flourishing of the Hindu people and by its awareness of the 
beauties of moral sentiment. He added: “As to the epithets of ‘crafty Brahman, cunning Brahman, mean 
Brahman, cheating Brahman, &c. &c.’ which our author so profusely bestows, they are suitable enough to 
the idle prating of a youth on his first arrival in India, but are unworthy of a grave doctor, who aims at 
a place amongst the investigators of Asiatic history and science” (Anonymous 1803, 29).  
Some of the most influential texts of this period showed ambiguous attitudes towards the 
moral status of caste in India. For instance, in his important translation of the text he called the “Code 
of Gentoo Law,” Halhed (1776, xlvviii-xlix) commented on the preliminary discourse which he said had 
been written by the Brahmins: “Nothing can be more remote from a superstitious Adherence to their 
own domestic Prejudices, or more truly elevated above the mean and selfish Principles of Priestcraft, 
                                                
1 In the Dutch Republic, France, and Britain, this is seen in popular texts like Bernard and Picart’s 
Religious Ceremonies of the World (Hunt, Jacob and Mijnhardt 2010). In Britain, we find this image in the 
entry “Hindoostan, or India” in a series of popular Gazetteers or Geographical Dictionaries of this age, 
which largely reproduced Scrafton’s account and which saw dozens of editions and imitations in the 
following decades. See the entry “Hindoostan, or India,” in the seventeenth edition of Brookes’s 
General Gazetteer (1820); see the similar or quasi-identical entries in Guthrie 1782, 546; Landmann 
1835; Marshall 1840, 377; Walker 1798). 
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than the genuine Dignity of Sentiment that breathes through this little Performance.” Surprisingly, this 
was the very preface where the hierarchy of the four varnas was explained. “These four great Tribes,” 
Halhed (1776, xlix) continued, “comprehend the first grand Divisions of a well-regulated State.” Things 
were no different in the case of the famous Orientalist William Jones and his translation of Manu’s 
“code of law.” While he disparaged this code as “a system of despotism and priestcraft, both indeed 
limited by law, but artfully conspiring to give mutual support, though with mutual checks,” he also 
wrote that it possessed “a spirit of sublime devotion, benevolence, and tenderness to all sentient 
creatures” (Forbes 1805, 28-9). In other words, the claims about the supremacy of the Brahmin 
priesthood could still go together with ambiguous moral assessments of other dimensions of caste.  
This ambiguity was not limited to Orientalists but extended to the practices and reflections of 
Christian missionaries. Many viewed the social distinctions of caste as a phenomenon in Indian society 
that led to unfortunate forms of discrimination. They admitted that such behaviour would need 
remedying in time and had no doubts about the fact that the Brahmins’ sacerdotal tyranny deserved 
destruction. However, these missionaries did not regard caste distinctions and practices as parts of an 
immoral and idolatrous system irreconcilable with Christianity. In fact, they accommodated many such 
practices in the local Christian communities and churches. Thus, the earliest Lutheran missionary to 
India, Bartholomeus Ziegenbalg of the Tranquebar Mission in present-day Tamil Nadu, allowed 
converts from different castes to sit in separate divisions in the church and even to separately go for 
communion at the Lord’s table. Similarly, the most successful Protestant missionary of eighteenth-
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century India, Christian Friedrich Schwarz, tolerated caste distinctions and never denounced them as 
unacceptable (see Kaye 1859, 350-57).  
As John Kaye recounts in his historical narrative of Christianity in India, this stance survived 
well into the nineteenth century. Consider, for instance, the weighty questions raised by a prominent 
church official, Reginald Heber, the second Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Calcutta:  
 
Is there no such thing, he asked himself, as Caste in Europe? Is there no such thing as Caste 
in America? Do not the high and the low sit apart in our English churches? Do not our well-
dressed high-caste folks go up first to the altar to communicate? Do high and low sit down to 
meat together—do their children attend the same schools? Are there no pariahs amongst us? 
In other civilized countries, is there not a prevailing sense of Caste, apart from all associations 
of worldly distinction? (Kaye 1859, 355) 
 
Certainly, the Bishop argued, it is a Christian principle that all men are equal in the sight of God, but 
it is equally certain they are not equal in the sight of Man. Social distinctions exist in all societies, he 
added, and it is a fair presumption to say that God never intended all men to be equal. Hence, caste 
should be tolerated as a type of social distinction similar to those that exist elsewhere (ibid.). 
Generally, the eighteenth-century accounts present us with many elements of the discourse 
about the caste system that would become dominant in later centuries. They suggest that the Hindu 
religion represents the civil laws of the Hindus as products of divine revelation. Feigning such a 
revelation, the ancient Hindu legislator wrote these rules into his sacred code of law. As the tribe of 
the priesthood, the Brahmins enforce this system and expound its sacred scriptures and laws, which 
grant them many privileges and set them apart from other Hindus. Now, if so many recognizable 
elements of the dominant discourse about the caste system were already present, the question “what 
was missing?” becomes all the more pertinent. That is, which other elements were still needed that 
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would allow for the emergence of the dominant picture of caste as an immoral social system – an 
institution that perversely renders immorality into a duty?  
3. The Evil of Caste 
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, a series of works appeared that left no doubt as to the 
immorality of the caste system. In his observations on the state of Indian society delivered to the British 
Parliament, the East India Company chairman Charles Grant pointed out the following: “Despotism is 
not only the principle of the government of Hindostan, but an original, fundamental, and irreversible 
principle in the very frame of society” (Grant 1813, 44; emphasis added). How so? Well, the Hindu law rests 
entirely on the fundamental position “that certain classes or races of the society are in their elementary 
principles, in the matter from which they were formed, absolutely of a higher nature, of a superior 
order in the scale of being, to certain other classes.”  
 
Now the evils that flow from such an arrangement, are infinite. Other modes of despotism lead 
in their very excess and abuse to a remedy, but here the chain of servitude is indissoluble and 
eternal. Though the highest orders be guilty of the most flagitious wickedness, pervert the use 
of power, become weak, arrogant and oppressive, the frame of society can suffer no change; that order 
must still continue in the enjoyment and exercise of all its vast privileges and prerogatives. The lowest rank, 
on the contrary, is doomed to perpetual abasement and unlimited subjection. It has no relief 
against the most oppressive and insulting tyranny, no hope of ever escaping from its sufferings.  
(ibid.; emphasis added)  
 
Under the fatal influence of this abominable system, William Ward agreed, the members of all four 
varnas have become inept and miserable. The Hindu system of caste, he added, is wholly the work of 
the Brahmins, who enslaved all other groups. “The rules of the shastras respecting the shoodrus are so 
unjust and inhuman, that every benevolent person must feel the greatest indignation at the Hindoo 
lawgivers, and rejoice that Providence has placed so great a portion of this people under the equitable 
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laws of the British Government” (Ward 1822, 91-2; emphasis added). This system also had horrible 
consequences: “But not only is the cast contrary to every principle of justice and policy; it is repugnant 
to every feeling of benevolence ... In short, the cast murders all the social and benevolent feelings; and 
shuts up the heart of man against man in a manner unknown even amongst the most savage tribes” 
(ibid., 145-6). 
 There is no need to multiply similar quotations to note that a shift occurred in these writings. 
It was considered self-evident by these authors that immoral principles are inbuilt into the very frame 
of Hindu society. The system of caste now counted as an oppressive tyranny opposed to every principle 
of justice, whose rules compel people to be unjust and inhuman to such an extent that all social and 
benevolent feelings are killed. In other words, in the eyes of these authors, caste had become an 
immoral social system (for more illustrations, see Anonymous 1818).  
Religious or Not? 
Is this shift all that remarkable? Some would situate it in a larger conflict between two groups of British 
colonials in this era: the Orientalists, relatively sympathetic to Indian culture, and the Anglicists, who 
argued for its substitution by European education and rational religion (Zastoupil and Moir 1999). 
Grant was a staunch evangelical and Ward a Baptist missionary; both shared the agenda of convincing 
the government of the need for allowing the propagation of the Gospel in British India. With this aim 
in mind, they stressed how terrible the state of society was and how false religion dominated every 
sphere of life among the Hindus. The evil of caste needed to be destroyed, not only by means of benign 
rule but also through the dissemination of true religion. In contrast, many other scholars and officials 
in the same period gave sympathetic accounts of Hindu society and argued against disrupting its 
religion and customs through missionary activity (for instance, see Stuart 1808).  
While there is truth to these claims, they lose sight of a crucial point: it is the conception of 
the caste system held by these Protestants – and not that of the Orientalists – that survives today in its 
basic outlines. That is, it is the missionaries who propagated the account of the caste system as an 
immoral social structure at the core of Hindu religion. It is they who insisted that this system compelled 
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the Hindus to act by the most unjust and inhuman principles. And it is this step that appears to have 
constituted the discourse about the immorality of Indian society. Therefore, it is all the more important 
to find out which new element(s) had caused this shift in the European understanding of caste. Had 
the missionaries discovered new facts about the structure of Indian society, which revised the views of 
the earlier Orientalists and other scholars? Had systematic study really laid bare the immoral core of 
the caste system? Or was this change rooted in a reconfiguration of their own religious views?  
To find answers to these questions, we need to turn to a dispute that had emerged among 
Christian missionaries in seventeenth-century India. The “Malabar rites controversy,” as it was later 
called, concerned a simple question: Did usages like the privilege of certain castes to wear a cotton 
thread around the torso, carrying a tuft of hair on a shaven head, or applying sandalwood paste to one’s 
face count as manifestations of religion or merely as civil observances? This dispute had its origins in 
the work of the Jesuit missionary Roberto De Nobili, who lived on the Malabar coast during the 
seventeenth century. He had not only adopted the dress and demeanour of an Indian sannyasin but also 
allowed his converts to keep their “national customs, in as far as these contained nothing wrong and 
referred to merely political or civil usages” (Brucker 1910, 558-62). That is, he did not compel Christian 
converts to renounce practices such as wearing the markers proper to one’s caste. He refrained from 
doing so because he viewed these as parts of a civil institution that divided the Indian nation into “four 
grades of civil functions to which there corresponds a similar gradation in nobility” (De Nobili 2000, 
57-62).  
Like Della Valle and Rogerius, De Nobili saw the Indians as a nation consisting of distinct clans 
or tribes ranked according to civic function and nobility. He identified the “Laws of Manu” as the 
authoritative civil law book that sanctioned this social organization of the Indian nation. However, he 
denied that the Brahmins constituted a priesthood. They were wise men with knowledge of the 
different sciences, he said, who received exceptional respect not because of some special religious status 
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but because of their learning. Consequently, the ranking of citizens and the privileges of certain groups 
in Indian society derived from civil status rather than religion (ibid., 63-76). 
De Nobili’s position on caste-related customs would soon be challenged by other missionaries 
and this led to tension between him and some officials of the Jesuit Society and the Church in Rome. 
However, when he put forward his arguments and produced his evidence, the Jesuit officials were 
satisfied and the Holy See provisionally decided the question in his favour. In an Apostolic Letter, Pope 
Gregory XV permitted Indian Christians to continue several of the relevant practices like wearing the 
sacred thread and performing ritual baths. Again, the decisive factor in these judgements about the 
customs of caste was the verdict that these were not inextricable parts of the religion of the Indians 
(Brucker 1910).  
Why was this so crucial? The concern about the religious nature of social practices went back 
all the way to early Christianity. After this religion had become dominant in the Roman Empire, the 
reach of “pagan idolatry” in everyday life became a crucial question. The worship of false gods was not 
limited to the cults, the church fathers said, but had tentacles across social life. Any practice could now 
be examined in terms of its connection to idolatry, from carving statues to attending games. If Christian 
authorities decided that the practice in question was religious, it became a sinful violation of God’s will 
and one of the devices invented to deceive people into worshipping the false god. In other words, 
whenever a practice could be connected to false religion in some way or the other, it entered the sphere 
of the prohibited; converts now had to renounce it (Balagangadhara 2014; Markus 1990, 16, 226).  
Early Christianity had thus carved up social life into three spheres: all actions essential to the 
worship of God were obligatory; all those related to idolatry or the worship of false gods were forbidden; 
and everything that remained was permitted, since it was indifferent to religion and the worship of God. 
In the early modern period, the same standard began to determine the Europeans’ moral judgements 
about the practices they encountered among idolatrous people in exotic parts of the world. If a practice 
was linked to false religion and idolatry, it could not but be immoral and forbidden; if it was merely 
civil or indifferent to religion, it was neutral and permitted. In India, this would prove decisive in the 
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theological dispute about caste practices, which resurfaced again and again from the seventeenth 
century onwards.  
In the early nineteenth century, the same dispute erupted in the south of India. After being 
consulted by local missionaries, Bishop Heber became involved in the issue of the religious and moral 
status of caste. On his journey through the south of India in the 1820s, he noted that several local 
missionaries had allowed their converts to preserve “very many of their ancient usages, particularly 
with regard to caste.” “The old school of Missionaries,” he added, “tolerated all this as a merely civil 
question of pedigree and worldly distinction, and in the hope that, as their converts became more 
enlightened, such distinctions would die away.” In one case, high-caste Indians had made the 
unacceptable demand to have a separate cup for the Sacrament. Younger German and English 
missionaries, however, preached against caste and prevented its practices as much as possible in the 
arrangement of their schools and congregations. They had gone even further and interfered with ancient 
practices in marriage ceremonies and domestic festivities, because they denounced all kinds of practices 
as Satan’s devices. One of the missionaries had “gone so far as, by way of punishment to compel a 
schoolboy of high caste to drink water from the cup of a Pariah” (Heber 1828, 444-5).  
That both parties were at fault was clear to Heber. Still, he considered this question about caste 
as a major challenge facing the church in India: 
 
The difficulty will be to ascertain how far the feeling of caste is really civil, and not religious, 
and how far the other practices objected to are really immoral or idolatrous. On these topics I 
am now busily making inquiry, and hope, in the course of my journey, to come at the truth so 
nearly as to prevent, at least, any gross scandal, without intrenching [sic] materially on what I 
conceive the natural liberty of the new convert, to live in all indifferent things in the manner 




Bishop Heber drew up a series of questions and submitted them to an Indian convert of exceptional 
intelligence and piety, known as Christian David. In response, David declared that caste was “purely a 
worldly idea,” among the natives of Southern India, “not connected in their minds with any notion of 
true or false religion.” Native converts from the higher castes, he said, avoided contact with low-caste 
proselytes, not on religious grounds but simply for social reasons. David related this stance to the 
coarse and indecent language and the less decorous and self-respectful way of life common among low-
caste people, which were revolting to high-caste people. He profoundly regretted that young 
missionaries had begun to argue for the total repudiation of caste and denounced the older generation 
of missionaries as “corrupters of the Gospel” for tolerating caste-related customs. After being informed 
by other European missionaries and Indian converts, Heber eventually concluded that caste – at least 
as it existed among converts – was an institution of social distinction differing little from the social 
exclusiveness that existed in Christian societies (Kaye 1859, 352-4).  
Even among the missionaries and church officials who took such conciliatory attitudes towards 
caste, the ambiguity about its religious and moral status remained present: Were caste distinctions 
acceptable only among Christian converts, because they lost their religious significance once the natives 
left the Hindu fold? Was caste a purely social institution even among the Hindus, very similar to the 
social distinctions in Europe and America? Or did it instead have religious foundations in Hinduism?    
This ambiguity soon gave way to a different stance and story. By the 1850s, so Duncan Forrester 
shows in his Caste and Christianity (1980), a new consensus had crystallized among the Protestant 
missionaries in India. It was not simply the case that some specific set of customs was religious, they 
argued, but that the entire system of caste was a “sacred institution” to the Hindus and an integral part 
of “the whole system of idolatry.” Converts now had to renounce all customs of caste as an expression 
of their embracing of Christ, for it did not concern a mere civil distinction but an institution to which 
the Hindus attributed a divine origin. Missionaries began to consider caste as the main obstacle to 
conversion: the system which held the Hindu religion together and protected it from disintegration in 
30 
	
the face of the Gospel (Forrester 1980, 23-48). In other words, this Protestant consensus transformed 
caste into a religious institution. Thus, it was transferred from the sphere of things indifferent to that 
of false religion, the realm of the prohibited. 
Civil Law and Divine Revelation  
Let us now formulate a second tentative hypothesis: caste emerged as an immoral social structure in the 
European understanding of India, because it came to be seen as a religious institution built around a system of laws 
that provided the core structure of Hinduism and the foundation of the Hindu nation. This shift allowed for the 
birth of the conceptual entity that we call “the caste system” by bringing together several clusters of 
ideas into one integral whole: the claims about the nation of the Hindus as a variant of that of the Jews; 
the conception of the Brahmin priesthood and its practices as an instance of false religion similar to 
the institutions of Catholicism and Judaism; the idea that such institutions deceived the believers into 
following a set of human fabrications as though these were divine commandments; the claim that the 
Hindu religion revolved around external ceremonies and concerns about purity and pollution. By 
integrating these elements into a coherent entity called “the caste system,” this shift provided order 
and stability to the European understanding of Indian culture and society. 
The early nineteenth-century sources show that elements of the earlier descriptions of caste 
now coalesced into a picture of one single system of which the law and religion of the Hindus were 
held to be mutually dependent parts. Charles Grant explained this system to the British politicians and 
administrators:  
 
The Hindoo law stands upon the same authority as the Hindoo religion; both are parts of one system, which 
they believe to have been divinely revealed. That law is regarded by them therefore with a 
superstitious veneration, which institutions avowedly of human origin do not produce; so that 
even under a foreign yoke, which in various particulars superseded its injunctions, it still 
maintained its credit. ... Nothing is more plain, than that this whole fabric is the work of a crafty 
and imperious priesthood, who feigned a divine revelation and appointment, to invest their 
31 
	
own order, in perpetuity, with the most absolute empire over the civil state of the Hindoos, as well as over 
their minds. (Grant 1813, 43-5; emphasis added)  
 
This passage brings together several elements. The charge that the Hindu priesthood feigned a divine 
revelation and appointment reflects the earlier notion that the Brahmins are like the Levites, the tribe 
of priests divinely appointed by God’s revelation of the covenant. This comes together with the critique 
of false religion as the fabrication of clerics who usurped religious authority in order to pursue worldly 
interest. As crafty priests, the Brahmins invented “the whole fabric of caste” to invest in their own 
order absolute power over all believers. The Hindus mistook this system for a religious institution of 
divine origin because of the ploy that both its religious beliefs and its civil laws are divinely revealed. While 
the ancient legislator does not appear in this particular passage, Grant (1813, 56) made it clear 
elsewhere that Hindu customs (like “widow-burning”) are presented as injunctions from a lawgiver 
believed to be divine and are therefore “admitted to have the force of a religious obligation.” It is this 
fabrication of divine origin that enables the priesthood to dominate the civil state of the Hindus and not 
just their religious life, by deceitfully imposing civil laws as though these constitute religious obligations. 
Because of the superstitious veneration that follows from this, the system of caste and its injunctions 
could survive foreign rule of India even when the rulers rejected some of these injunctions. 
In brief, this shift brought the elements together to form a coherent conception of “the scheme 
of caste”: a system that had merged civil law and religion into one whole by claiming a divine origin for 
itself. Protestant missionaries from a variety of denominations now began to argue that the inveterate 
distinction of caste is incorporated with the “whole religious economy” of the Hindus (Harvard 1823, 
183), that the institution of caste is not “a mere political expedient” but “belongs to the religion of 
Hindostan” (Adam 1824, 27), that “caste is not a civil but a sacred institution,—not an ordinance of 
human but of divine appointment” (Duff 1840, 123-4), that “Caste is not merely a political or social 
distinction, as many have strangely declared, but that it is, in the view of the Hindu, most sacred in its 
claims” and “that it is not a mere civil distinction, but emphatically religious” (Roberts 1847, 16, v). The 
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Madras Missionary Conference perhaps put it most clearly in its declaration of 1850, which concluded 
decades of dispute about the status of caste: 
 
Caste, which is a distinction among the Hindoos, founded upon supposed birth-purity and 
impurity, is in its nature essentially a religious institution, and not a mere civil distinction. The Institutes 
of Menu and other Shastras regard the division of the people into four castes, as of Divine 
appointment. We find, also, that stringent laws were enacted for upholding this important part of the 
Hindoo religion. Future rewards are decreed to those who retain it, and future punishments to those who 
violate it. The Hindoos of the present day believe, that the preservation - or loss of caste deeply 
affects their future destiny. (Cited in Meigs 1854, 471; emphasis added) 
 
Here, we see once again how the conclusion that caste was a religious institution implied that it 
revolved around a system of stringent laws falsely believed to be of “divine origin.” This entire system 
decreed future rewards to those who obey its rules and future punishment to those who do not. Thus, 
the Protestants’ postulation of a religious-cum-civil system of laws at the heart of Hindu society allowed 
the elements of earlier European descriptions of caste to coalesce into one coherent Gestalt.  
Caste and Hinduism 
Throughout the nineteenth century, missionaries and other authors stated that caste was not only 
inseparably connected to Hinduism but also formed its core structure. This claim addressed a persistent 
problem in the Western understanding of Indian culture and society: the religion of the Hindus seemed 
to be an incoherent amalgamation of all kinds of doctrines, traditions, practices, texts, myths, and 
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groups, without any shared creed, sacred text, or religious authority. How could it then be a religion at 
all?2  
 Scholars did not raise this question as a challenge to the dominant European understanding of 
Indian culture and society. In fact, they did not even contemplate the possibility that the incoherent 
and chaotic appearance of “Hinduism” was a problem internal to the structure of their experience and 
theorizing. Closer studies of Indian society kept generating anomalies that put into disarray the account 
of the “heathen” people of India as a nation of castes united by a common religion. However, instead 
of realizing that these were problems internal to the European account of Hinduism, scholars engaged 
in a protective move: they externalized this disorder as a characteristic property of the religion in 
question. Over the decades, Western scholars began to characterize Hinduism as “a chaos,” “a jungle” 
or a “banyan tree,” which nevertheless formed the religion of the Hindus (see De Roover and Claerhout 
2010).  
Of course, this generated another question. How could a religion whose main characteristic 
appeared to be disorder survive and retain its followers? Surely, it would have to fall apart. Yet, 
Hinduism had survived for centuries if not millennia. Given its apparent lack of structure, what kept 
this religion together and prevented it from falling apart? This issue was of particular importance to 
Christian missionaries in India, since they professed the aim of breaking the hold of false religion. 
Consider a discussion on caste that occurred among the missionaries and converts of the Free Church 
of Scotland in Madras in November 1845. The diversity of groups in Indian society, they stated, had 
made it seem as though the Indian people did not have one religion but was divided into “so many 
religious sects and subdivisions, which divide families and tribes from one another.” Yet there was 
unity behind this diversity. Indeed, the Hindus did not worship one God or one common Lord, but “on 
                                                
2 Such comments about the chaotic nature of Hinduism would return again and again from the 
eighteenth to the twentieth century: for instance, see Harcourt 1924, 28; Lyall 1884, 1-2; Orme 1805, 
437; Strachey 1911, 315-7; Whitehead 1924, 4; Wilson 1862, 1.  
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the other hand, Caste is a thing which is common and sacred to them all” (in Roberts 1847, 121-2). In 
other words, in caste, the missionaries claimed to have found the common system that held the nation 
and religion of the Hindus together. 
The discussion in Madras had started by putting the following question to native converts: “Is 
Caste inseparably connected with Hinduism, or is it not?” The neophytes dutifully gave the answers the 
missionaries had taught them. Again and again, it was repeated that caste is not simply connected to 
Hinduism but that “Caste is nothing but Hinduism itself” (in Roberts 1847, 121). One convert said 
that both the sacred texts and the everyday notions of caste that a Hindu receives from his parents left 
no doubt “that Caste and religion are synonymous.” This unity between caste and religion derived from 
the fact that the institutes of Manu and other standards of the Hindu religion claim that both “have 
sprung from one and the same source, the mind of the Supreme Being” (in Roberts 1847, 66-8).  
Another convert looked at “the facts.” From the fact that caste is considered divine in its origin 
and that its main aim is to teach how “to regulate the conduct towards the gods, with reference to 
future births and final absorption,” he inferred the following conclusion: “Caste is now so inseparably 
part of the Hindu system, that any attempt to sever it from what is considered religious, would be to 
render Hinduism, as it now exists, a mass of confusion” (in Roberts 1847, 80-81). Yet another witness 
summed things up in a metaphor: 
 
Who ever thought of separating Caste from Hinduism, or Hinduism from Caste? They are so 
joined together, that the life of the one depends on the life of the other, and the death of the 
one on the death of the other. You have all seen on the hedges a plant so twisted round another 
as to be wholly supported by it, so that both seemed to be one tree. If you separate the one 
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from the other, it will be like a reed shaken with the wind. So, if you separate Caste from 
Hinduism, it will come to nothing. (In Roberts 1847, 110) 
 
The followers of Hinduism had nothing in common except the system of caste; therefore, this religion 
would dissolve without this core structure. This “discovery” instantiated the same kind of cognitive 
move that European scholars of Indian culture had engaged in before. The idea that caste was the sacred 
institution at the heart of Hindu religion had brought internal order to the European experience and 
understanding of Indian culture. However, this was again externalized as though it concerned a structural 
property of the alleged religion and social system of the Hindus.  
In the dominant discourse, caste had now become the structure that held Hinduism together. 
As one author put it: because of the divine origin that the Hindus attributed to caste, this system could 
form the cement of the fabric of the Hindu religion, which pervaded and closely bound the whole (Duff 
1840, 616-7). In other words, once Europeans had attributed this status to caste, this enabled them to 
see “the Hindu religion” and “its caste system” as a coherent whole. Seemingly, they could now fit any 
factual finding or textual passage into this well-cemented building, which held together their 
understanding and experience of Indian society. 
The Moral Structure 
How could the Protestants’ conclusion that caste was religious have this kind of impact? I do not have 
any conclusive answers to give here, but we can take some tentative steps forward. From a Christian 
perspective, the distinction between a religious and a civil institution revolves around the fact that the 
former has to be of divine origin and embody the purpose of God, whereas the latter is merely a human 
creation. Thus, Catholicism views the Church as a religious institution, simultaneously divine and 
human. Even though manned by human beings, the Church has to represent the purpose of God on 
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earth; therefore, its laws count as religious obligations.3 Similarly, the Jews hold that the Mosaic law is 
a revelation from God: the rules of the covenant state His expectations towards the nation of Israel and 
these include regulations as to the institutions and practices of everyday life.  
These claims about religious institutions and the distinction between religious and civil law 
had known a long history in Christianity but they gained particular importance during the Protestant 
Reformation. Reformers like Luther and Calvin argued that the authority of human legal institutions 
could only be civil or political and never religious. Canon law, according to them, was a system of 
human law falsely presented as religious by claiming divine sanction. The Church and its clerical 
hierarchy did not represent God’s purpose on earth but it was a purely human institution that falsely 
presents itself as religious and imposes its fabrications onto the believers in the name of God’s will 
(see De Roover 2015, 86-137).  
The Reformation also revived a similar argument about Judaism. While God had indeed 
revealed himself to Moses at Mount Sinai, Christian theologians argued, the first covenant of law had 
been abrogated by the Gospel and its covenant of grace and freedom. This implied that the continued 
existence of rabbinic Judaism involves a similar deception as that inflicted by the papacy. To trick the 
believers into a human bondage of law and external ceremonies, the Jewish priesthood continued to 
present the laws and customs of the nation of Israel as divine commandments, even though they had 
lost this religious status and become purely civil or political in nature.  
From the Protestant perspective, if caste was an institution of false religion, it would have to 
function in a similar way. That is, the Hindu religion would enforce the civil laws of caste by falsely 
claiming that the system is rooted in divine revelation. This ploy gave caste its deceptive strength and 
allowed the system to reproduce itself in spite of the immorality of its injunctions. The perpetrators of 
                                                
3 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 760, § 778; 
URL: < http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P27.HTM>; consulted on 11 February 2015. 
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the ploy could not but be a class of cunning clerics. They deceived the Hindus into believing that strict 
obedience to the laws of caste is essential to religion and to the rewards of this and the future life. In 
this picture of Hinduism, divine worship involves abiding by the religious obligations of caste, while 
violating these obligations results in excommunication from the system of Hindu society (and inferior 
rebirth for one’s soul). What makes the Hindus so blind to the iniquity of the laws of caste, according 
to the same picture, is the superstitious awe continuously reinforced by the Brahmins to deceive them 
into the delusion that caste laws constitute religious obligations. (Of course, this raises the question 
as to where the Brahmins get this extraordinary capacity to deceive ordinary believers.)  
In this nineteenth-century account of caste and Hinduism, we see the original outlines of the 
peculiar moral structure that continues to be attributed to the caste system unto this day. Together, 
caste and Hinduism form a religious system that misleads the Hindus into following a set of immoral 
principles as the requirements of morality. In other words, the entire structure of today’s dominant 
conception of “the caste system” derives from a Protestant-Christian account, which basically describes 
caste as an institution of false religion that deceptively merges civil laws with religious obligations.  
If we were to discard the overtly biblical elements from the nineteenth-century missionary 
descriptions of Hinduism and caste, it would become difficult to distinguish them from the 
contemporary moral discourse. In its outlines, the basic message of anti-caste academics and activists 
corresponds largely to that propagated by Christian critics more than two hundred years ago. Others 
have noted how the Christian polemics against Judaism functioned as conceptual resources for the 
British colonial attack on Hindu law and ritual (Yelle 2013, 137-160). However, they ignore how these 
conceptual resources determined the basic structures and immorality that are still attributed to the 
caste system today.  
First, today’s critics chastise the caste system for providing people with certain privileges and 
occupations according to the caste of their birth and thus imprisoning individuals in the social position 
in which they are born, no matter how talented they may be. Second, the system is accused of giving 
some castes a sense of inherent privilege and entitling them to control, discriminate, and humiliate 
38 
	
these others. Third, it supposedly draws on religion to divide the Indian people into distinct groups 
separated by insurmountable barriers. Fourth, it dehumanizes the untouchable castes or Dalits by 
excluding them from all civilized social life and treating them like animals or worse. Together, these 
aspects are said to make the caste system “one of the most brutal modes of hierarchical social 
organisation that human society has known” (Roy 2014).4 
The original religious core driving such judgements becomes visible when we remember that 
they were aimed not only at Hinduism but also at Catholicism and Judaism. That is, these criticisms of 
“the caste system” result from conceptualizing it as a structural variant of the institutions of the latter 
two religions. In fact, most of the major criticisms of caste can be traced back to a contrast made by 
Protestant Christianity between the state of society under true religion and that of societies under the 
rule of “false religion” and its “bondage of law.” Unlike its corrupt rivals, Protestants said, true religion 
does not allow for divinely appointed classes of people with certain privileges supposedly granted to 
them by God. Under the Gospel, distinctions of rank and all other human institutions and laws are 
merely civil and never religious. Hence, any person could rise (or descend) from one rank to another, 
regardless the accidents of birth. In contrast, corrupt religion cuts up the community of believers into 
                                                
4 For some recent instances of this moral discourse about the caste system, see Guru (2016), Jadhav 
(2005), Teltumbde (2015), and the debates in a Subcommittee of the United States Congress: India’s 
Unfinished Agenda: Equality and Justice for 200 Million Victims of the Caste System, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations of the Committee on 
International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session 
(October 6, 2005), 10–11, 14, 16–18, 29–31. 
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classes of people by birth and divine appointment and thus creates insurmountable barriers 
(Anonymous 1818; Roberts 1847, 4-5).  
4. Conclusion 
What is today presented as an analysis based on human rights and principles of equality started out 
very differently. The entire discourse relied on clusters of theological background ideas about the 
relationship between Christianity and Judaism, the New and the Old Testament, the nature of 
priesthood, the separation of civil law from religious obligation, and the status of social distinctions in 
relation to religion. In turn, these clusters were embedded in a much larger framework that had 
emerged out of the Reformation and its interpretations of the Bible. More than being a set of explicit 
ideas only, this framework consists of implicit conceptual resources that have allowed Europeans to 
make sense of the popular descriptions about religion and caste in India. 
 How is all of this possible? Most of today’s authors writing about the caste system know next 
to nothing about these centuries-old intra-Christian debates. Yet, academics, activists, and journalists 
keep drawing upon a conceptual apparatus that derives from concerns and concepts internal to these 
debates. They would not accept that the Hindu people is a variant of the biblical nation of Israel, that 
Christianity superseded Judaism, or that the Brahmins are a hybrid of the Jewish tribe of the priesthood 
and the Catholic clergy. Probably, many of them would not even agree that the caste system is a 
religious institution that deceives people into embracing human-made laws as though these are divine 
commandments. Still, their conceptual vocabulary indicates that they implicitly accept the truth of such 
theological claims. 
 The apparent implausibility of this conclusion indicates that much more research is needed to 
strengthen this hypothesis about the emergence of the conceptual entity called “the caste system.” Yet 
it also indicates how promising this research is: however tentative and incomplete the two proposed 
hypotheses may be, they succeed at generating new questions that need answering.  
Consider the fact that the early modern Christian conceptions of the biblical nation of Israel 
turn out to be central to the dominant European descriptions of the people and culture of India. How 
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is this possible? Two sub-questions are involved here. The first concerns the ubiquity of this 
interpretation of the Old Testament among the educated classes of early modern Europe. Travellers 
like Della Valle, Orientalists like De la Crequinière and Halhed, missionaries like De Nobili, Rogerius, 
and Ward, and colonial officials like Orme, Scrafton, and Grant – all of them drew upon this account 
when they described the religion and social life of India. This means that the Christian conception of 
the ancient Jews must have been part and parcel of their cognitive world. Its terms of description were 
readily available to them as conceptual resources that helped them to understand other cultures. From 
recent studies, we know that certain ideas about the biblical nation of Israel had become widely present 
in the political thinking of seventeenth-century Europe (Nelson 2010; Sutcliffe 2003). But how exactly 
could such ideas about the Old Testament Jews become central to the cognitive world of such different 
types of Europeans?  
The second question concerns the fact that modern Europeans viewed the “heathens” of India 
as a variant of this ancient nation of Israel. How could it make sense to see an alien people found on 
the Indian subcontinent as a variant of the Jews who had lived in the Middle East more than 1,500 
years before? Facile explanations are at hand here. Some scholars, for instance, may insist that certain 
aspects of Hinduism indeed look similar to Judaism. But then such similarities are apparent only 
because a particular background framework shapes the available descriptions of both “religions.” So 
the question becomes: how did this background framework give shape to the dominant discourse about 
Hinduism and the caste system? Here, we need a closer study of the different elements in the 
emergence of the early modern European account of the Old Testament Jews. We also need to examine 
their transformation into the conceptual resources used by European culture to make sense of alien 
peoples and societies. How do these accounts of Hinduism, Judaism, and the caste system reflect the 
dynamics that were shaping European culture and its conceptual world in this period?  
There are more implications. The basic nineteenth-century description of the caste system 
integrated earlier theological ideas into one coherent whole: a system that merged civil and religious 
law by ascribing a divine origin to both. Initially, this diagnosis was specific to Protestant analyses but 
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it soon appeared in the most popular geographical and historical works of Western Europe, written by 
authors with a variety of religious and philosophical backgrounds. Without even referring to the biblical 
account of the nation of Israel or the Protestant objections to the Catholic Church, these authors told 
stories about India that presupposed elements from both theological accounts. What cognitive 
resources must have been present among their readership in Europe to allow for this? How could the 
concern about the relationship between religious and civil law resonate among so many authors and 
their readers? What does this tell us about the dynamics shaping the development of European 
societies during this era? Since today’s Western scholars and their readers continue to buy into the 
same story about “Hinduism” and “the caste system,” the scope of this question is even wider. How is 
it possible that people still continue to reproduce an inherently implausible account of Indian society, 
even though they are ignorant of the Christian concerns and conceptual schemes that held together 
this account? 
 The situation becomes all the more puzzling when we turn to the Indian debates on the caste 
system. These also presuppose the existence of a social organization that deceives the Hindus into 
living by a set of immoral principles disguised as moral obligations. Thus, they also rely on elements 
from the Protestant consensus about “the Hindu system.” Yet, Indian academics and activists do not 
belong to a culture constituted by centuries of Christian religious dynamics. They cannot possibly share 
the background framework that allowed the Western educated public to make sense of such 
descriptions of Indian culture. For instance, the concepts and concerns related to the relationship 
between Christianity and Judaism or that between Protestantism and Catholicism must be alien here. 
Nonetheless, educated Indians reproduce descriptions and criticisms that emerged from mapping “the 
caste system” onto these concepts and concerns. This has been going on for over two centuries and 
even led to laws enacted by the Indian authorities. Did this conception of the caste system then really 
find roots in the cognitive world of a very different culture? How could it do so? That is, how are these 
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descriptions of caste understood by the Indian intelligentsia, given that the conceptual resources 
needed to make sense of them must be missing here?  
 These are all questions for future research. They are significant not only as theoretical concerns 
but also because of their practical consequences. The moral discourse about caste was part of an 
attempt by Christian missionaries and colonial officials to remedy situations in Indian society which 
they perceived as unjust and inhumane. When Indians adopted this discourse, this was often part of 
their effort to address problems of injustice and oppression in their society. Today, we are in the 
privileged position of pointing out the flaws in these past attempts. We realize that the dominant 
conceptual language does not help us in formulating the problems of Indian society, let alone in solving 
them. However, with the privilege comes a responsibility: that of identifying the flaws in the current 
conception of the caste system in such a way that future generations will be able to go beyond these and 
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